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Polish Migration Policy in the Context 
of the Migration Crisis
Abstract
The migration crisis of 2015 has left its mark on many EU countries. 
Some, such as Greece or Spain, were countries on the front line. Others, 
namely Germany, Great Britain, and Sweden became destination countries 
for many newcomers. Some, like the countries of the Visegrad Group, 
opposed the actions and decisions of the EU made in the face of the crisis. 
European solidarity has become a big question mark and we can observe 
a serious upsetting of the whole integration project which is, of course, up 
for discussion. This state of affairs consisted of the attitudes towards the 
crises of such countries as Poland or Hungary, where anti-immigration 
and populist parties came to power, creating a vision of fl exible solidarity 
on the European political scene. The purpose of this article is to analyse 
the Polish migration policy, show the direction of the changes in its 
construction along with the change of government and the societal reaction 
to strangers, as a direct result of actions taken by the ruling parties. It is 
important to understand the political, economic and social context of the 
changes occurring in the social consciousness and to attempt to formulate 
a forecast for the future.
Keywords: Migration, Refugees, Migration Crisis, Migration Policy, 
Poland, Flexible Solidarity
Introduction
The migration crisis of 2015 has left its mark on many EU countries. 
Some, like Greece and Spain, were countries on the front line. Others, such 
as Germany, Great Britain and Sweden, were the destination countries 
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for many newcomers. Some, like the Visegrád Group, were countries that 
contested the actions and decisions of the EU in the face of the crisis.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the Polish migration policy 
implemented over the last 10 years and to show the direction of the 
changes in its construction. The author takes the liberty of arguing that 
the activities of the current Polish government of the Law and Justice 
party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) aim to implement a populist migration 
policy based on inciting the fear of strangers, which has dominated many 
political scenes in recent years. The main questions formulated in the 
context of the presented problem were: how were the objectives of this 
policy formulated before the migration crisis, during the coalition of 
the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and the Polish People’s Party 
(Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) coalition? How did the migration crisis 
affect the Polish society? What is the proposed direction of the changes 
in migration policy suggested by the government of Law and Justice as 
a result of these events? What is the role of the ruling parties and media 
(largely controlled by these parties) in shaping social attitudes? The 
attempt to formulate answers to such questions necessitated the use of 
research methods such as the comparative method and decision analysis.
Formation of the Polish Migration Policy After 1989
In 1989, after the political change, Poland faced large migration fl ows 
for the fi rst time since the Second World War. As a result of social and 
political changes and processes related to the liberalisation of the rules of 
entry and stay for foreigners on the territory of the Republic of Poland, 
Poland became a transit or destination country for certain national groups. 
The 1990s brought a signifi cant infl ux of citizens of the former USSR 
and Vietnam, as well as Romanian Roma. Poland was not prepared for 
such events, with no procedures and legal regulations in place concerning 
the admission of foreigners, and moreover it had not participated in the 
creation of international standards and regulations in this respect. The 
external situation of Poland was also quite complicated. We had to take 
into account the infl ux of migrants and refugees on the eastern border, 
who could come as a result of the threats arising from the uncontrolled 
disintegration of the USSR, while the western border with Germany 
constituted a route of illegal migration, which Poland did not have 
institutional, logistic and legal systems to face.
In the above situation, Poland did not have the time and conditions to 
create its own migration policy in the way it could be done by European 
countries with long migration traditions. Even if other models of creating 
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such a policy were known, there were no fi nancial resources, experts or 
infrastructure to quickly implement them on the Polish soil. Poland was 
“learning” migration and reacted spontaneously to phenomena rather 
than creatively created its own policy. The Polish society, unfamiliar with 
migration problems, was not interested in them, as were the NGOs that 
were only being established at the time and had not yet acknowledged this 
problem as one within their sphere of interest. Solutions and decisions 
initiated by authorized institutions and structures took place without 
social consultations and public discussion. Their aim was temporary: 
to stabilise the migration situation in the country, create legal bases for 
admitting foreigners, guarantee the basic human rights and fi nd safe 
places for them to stay for the duration of refugee procedures.
In 1998 Poland started accession negotiations with the EU and entered 
the period of adaptation of the Polish law to the EU acquis, also with 
regard to dealing with various groups of foreigners. This process ended 
with the adoption of two key acts in 2003: the Act on Foreigners and 
the Act on granting protection to foreigners within the territory of the 
Republic of Poland.1
This major effort to bring Polish law in line with EU standards and 
norms was made in a relatively short period of time, with full focus on 
the EU dimension. There was not enough time and “intuition” to build 
up those aspects of migration policy which are not in the sphere of 
community interest, but are extremely important from the point of view 
of the country: analytical and forecasting works which would allow for 
planning migration and its directions, and then pragmatic and effective 
management and integration activities.
Poland’s accession to the EU posed new challenges for the Polish 
authorities. Mass labour migration of Poles began as countries opened 
their labour markets to them one by one after the transition period. 
According to GUS (the Central Statistical Offi ce of Poland) estimates, 
in 2008 there were over 2.3 million new migrants living outside Poland, 
of which about 1.8 million in the EU Member States.2 The scale of the 
phenomenon made it necessary to undertake actions aimed at protecting 
the interests of Polish citizens remaining abroad. At the same time, since 
mainly young people with good professional qualifi cations left the country, 
1  The Act of 13th June 2003 on Foreigners, Journal of Laws of 2003, no. 128, 
item 1175; The Act of 13th June 2003 on granting protection to foreigners within the 
territory of the Republic of Poland, Journal of Laws of 2003 no. 128, item 1176.
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it was considered appropriate to focus on supporting return migration. 
And because such mass migrations devastated the Polish labour market, 
there was a demand for work of foreigners.
This was the political, social and economic background of the Polish 
migration policy, which was started by the liberal government of the Civic 
Platform for Polish People’s Republic (PO/PSL) to present a document 
entitled: „The migration policy of Poland – the current state of affairs and 
proposed actions”3 for public consultation in 2012.
The Principles of the Polish Migration Policy 
Before the Crisis of 2015
The emigration of Poles as a result of the opening of European labour 
markets and the infl ow of foreigners to Poland as a result of political 
changes and accession make it possible to assess the state of migration 
in our country. In recent years, Poland has not become a net migration 
country. This might suggest that the creation of a coherent migration 
policy planned for years ahead is not as important in Poland as in the 
case of European countries with past and present migration. However, 
it is necessary to take into account the circumstances which may in the 
near future intensify the need to regulate this sphere of policy and create 
prospects for the future.
The demographic situation in Poland and the growing needs of the 
labour market make it necessary to open up to foreigners, mainly to 
newcomers from the eastern border, due to their cultural proximity. 
Polish employers are putting pressure on the teams in power to liberalise 
access to the Polish labour market. Past experience shows that foreign 
workers play a complementary role on this market by taking up jobs 
that are not attractive for domestic workers, or where their unique 
competences constitute signifi cant added value. Therefore, the argument 
about depriving Polish citizens of jobs is devoid of any raison d’être. 
This confi rms the dual labour market theory.4 Those who work legally in 
Poland pay social security contributions, thus strengthening the social 
system, and while living in Poland they spend money here, thus improving 
the national budget. Creating controlled channels of infl ow of migrants 
and looking ahead in this context seems extremely desirable. In addition, 
the international situation and Poland’s international obligations may 
3  Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania (The migration 
policy of Poland – the current state of affairs and proposed actions), Warszawa 2012.
4  P.B. Doeringer, M.J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, 
M. E. Sharp, New York 1971.
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repeatedly make it necessary to confront the need to provide protection 
and assistance to refugees, and without thorough legal, institutional 
and social preparations, an effi cient solution to the problems may prove 
impossible to fi nd.
The discussion on the admission of foreigners to a given country 
revolves around two aspects: security and the needs of the labour market. 
Depending on the political option, the fi rst or the second aspect becomes 
superior. In the case of Poland and the liberal government PO/PSL, 
which was in power in 2007–2015, the migration policy was subordinated 
to the labour market. The programme document „Migration Policy of 
Poland...” identifi ed the positive and negative effects of migration. 
The analysed programme document puts emphasis on the preparation 
of medium- and long-term migration policy so as to supplement the 
shortages of labour force on the Polish labour market, resulting from the 
demographic situation and emigration. The experience of other countries 
in a similar situation much earlier makes it obvious that migration can 
only alleviate the lack, and not resolve it permanently. Moreover, social 
problems which may occur as a result of the change in the ethnic structure 
and, as a consequence, the undermining of social cohesion, also require 
attention.5 Such phenomena may occur in particular in countries such as 
Poland, where the national structure is extremely homogeneous: 97% of 
the population is Polish.6
Among the recommendations formulated by the previous political 
option, it is worth noting opening the access to the labour market for 
foreigners legally residing in Poland, the development of a simplifi ed 
mechanism for taking up employment in Poland (a system of employer’s 
declarations on entrusting work to a foreigner instead of a work permit), 
the creation of an active system for attracting foreign workers (bilateral 
international agreements) and fi nally facilitating access to the labour 
market for graduates of Polish universities, highly qualifi ed employees 
and foreigners with desirable professional qualifi cations. The trend 
of inclusion of foreigners studying here into the Polish labour market 
is particularly interesting and worth investing in. In the academic year 
5  Raport “Polska 2030 – strategie, oczekiwania, opracowania” (Poland 2030 – strate-
gies, expectations, studies), p. 81, http://polska2030.pl/dlugookresowa-strategia-rozwoju
-kraju-polska-2030-trzecia-fala-nowoczesnosci/#comment-1263 (access 10.07.2019).
6  National, ethnic, linguistic and religious structure of the Polish population. National 
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2016/17, 65 793 foreign students from 166 countries studied in Poland. 
Since 2005, the number of foreign students has consistently increased 
at Polish universities and now constitutes 4.88% of the total number 
of students (eight years ago there were only 0.61% of them). The 
dominant group of foreigners at Polish universities are students from 
Ukraine and Belarus. In the academic year 2016/17, 35,584 Ukrainians 
and 5,119 Belarusians studied in Poland. The constant increase in the 
number of students from these countries results, among others, from 
a similar culture, close neighbourhood and Poland’s membership in 
the EU.7 These young people are very well acquainted with the Polish 
reality, know the language, already have friends here and the process 
of their integration is extremely promising.
In their recommendations, the authors of the Polish migration policy 
draft also indicated that this policy plan takes into account special 
provisions for foreigners of Polish origin who, as a result of various 
historical turmoil (changes of borders, politically motivated exile), found 
themselves outside the territory of Poland. Their potential has been 
particularly worth utilising and the obligations of the state towards this 
group of foreigners are unusual.
The attitudes of the liberal government of PO/PSL towards foreigners, 
including refugees, were positive and politically correct. One of the PSL 
politicians, Eugeniusz Kłopotek, MP, spoke in one of the interviews 
about the admission of 7,000 refugees, which Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz 
declared during the refugee crisis of 2015: „If these people are to muddle 
our values, what values are these?”.8 The politician has thus raised an 
extremely important issue of European values, which we so often refer 
to, which we so often hide behind and which we disregard in so many 
politically convenient cases. The Prime Minister of the government of 
the coalition PO/PSL Ewa Kopacz, who was a guest of the 25th Economic 
Forum in Krynica-Zdrój, devoted her speech, among others, to the issue 
of refugees – „This is an issue for the whole of Europe and solidarity 
of the whole Europe. It is our duty to accept those who are fl eeing in 
defence of their lives.”, she said. „We benefi ted, and very much so, from 
the solidarity with our friends, partners from Europe, when we ourselves 
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were refugees. Today, we must not forget this. We must not be insensitive 
to the misfortune which the media show every day”.9 The Prime Minister 
stressed then that it is necessary for this solidarity to be responsible, 
taking into account the fi nancial and logistical possibilities as well as the 
„emotions” of Polish society.
The Migration Crisis and Responses 
of the Countries of the Region
According to Eurostat data, 1.2 million people applied for asylum 
in the European Union in 2015.10 The most in Germany, Hungary and 
Sweden.11 The intense pace at which the refugees were arrival and the 
unpreparedness on the part of EU Member States caused chaos, political 
and social unrest, and fi nally hastily and not always correctly made 
decisions.
As part of the European Program on Migration adopted in 2015,12 the 
fi rst concrete measures were taken – relocation of 40,000 people from 
Greece and Italy was agreed upon (decision of May 2015) and 120,000 
(decision of September 2015) and resettlement of 20 thousand people from 
outside the EU within 2 years. These decisions were strongly criticized by 
the Visegrad Group (V4), including Poland. Admittedly, the government 
of the Civic Platform, at the end of its term, agreed to accept the 7,000. 
people allocated to Poland to be relocated, but the Prime Minister of 
the new right-wing government formed by Law and Justice after the 
parliamentary election (25/10/2015), Beata Szydło, questioned the refugee 
allocation “imposed” on Poland.
When analysing the position of the Visegrad Group in the context of 
the refugee crisis we have to mention about September 2016, when an 
informal summit of EU countries took place, during which the V4 prime 
9  M. Kareńska, Premier Ewa Kopacz gościem XXV Forum Ekonomicznego (Prime 
Minister Ewa Kopacz as a guest of the 25th Economic Forum), Salon24, 14.09.2015, https://
www.salon24.pl/u/margaretkarenmtv24/668897,premier-ewa-kopacz-gosciem-xxv-
forum-ekonomicznego (access 13.07.2019).
10  Asylum in the EU Member States. Record number of over 1.2 million fi rst time 




12  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Coun-
cil, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
European Migration Program, Brussels, 13.05.2015, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/PL/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0240&from=EN (access 6.07.2019).
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ministers presented the concept of „fl exible solidarity” in the context of 
solving the refugee crisis. It assumes that the Member States themselves – 
taking into account their potential and experience – would decide on the 
form in which they will participate in the EU migration policy and solve 
the refugee crisis, and that participation in refugee distribution programs 
should be voluntary and dependent on the given country’s ability.13 The 
V4 Group upholds this position to this day.
Foreigners in Poland and Poles Abroad 
as Recipients of the Country’s Migration Policy
The analysis of the situation of foreigners in Poland should start with 
defi ning the very concept in the Polish law and determining the number 
of people being analysed.
According to art. 3 of the Act on Foreigners of December 12, 2013, 
„a foreigner is any person who does not hold Polish citizenship”.14 
According to art. 5 of this act, a foreigner who is a citizen of two or more 
countries is treated as a citizen of the country whose document he used 
when entering the territory of the Republic of Poland.
In connection with Poland’s accession to the EU and the adoption of 
community law, in the present article the author distinguishes between 
foreigners who are EU citizens and have freedom of movement within 
the EU and foreigners who are citizens of a third country, i.e. a non-EU 
Member State.
Attempts to estimate the number of foreigners staying in Poland are 
extremely diffi cult. This is due to the fact that institutions collecting such 
data, including The Central Statistical Offi ce and the Offi ce for Foreigners 
do it in different ways – the Central Statistical Offi ce relies on censuses, 
and these rely on various types of permits to enter and stay. Still other 
data are given by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, focusing on 
the number of submitted declarations on entrusting work to a foreigner. 
Another factor hindering the provision of precise information is that 
a signifi cant part of migration to Poland is circulating in nature. Added to 
this is irregular migration (otherwise illegal, taking place without proper 
13  Pomysł Grupy Wyszehradzkiej na kryzys migracyjny spodobał się reszcie Unii 




14  Act on Foreigners of 13th December 2013, Journal of Laws of 2013, no. 128, 
item 1650.
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documents and permits), which leaves no traces in the registers of any 
institutions.
According to the last census of 2011, 94.83% of the population had 
Polish citizenship, and 2.26% had both Polish and foreign citizenship.
Data of the Offi ce for Foreigners refer to people who stay in Poland 
long-term. These are mainly statistics showing the number of valid 
residence permits held by foreigners. In the case of third-country nationals, 
the documents confi rming the right of residence on the territory of the 
Republic of Poland are, among others, residence cards issued in connection 
with a temporary stay, permanent residence, obtaining a long-term EU 
resident status, as well as refugee status or other forms of protection. 
According to data as of January 1st, 2019, 372 thousand foreigners had 
a valid residence permit,15 including citizens of:
–  Ukraine 179 thousand 
–  Belarus 20 thousand
–  Vietnam 12,6 thousand
–  India 8,8 thousand
–  Georgia 2,9 thousand
The numbers above do not include people staying in Poland on the 
basis of visas or declarations on entrusting work to a foreigner. This 
applies in the fi rst place to Ukrainian citizens, whose number in Poland 
has been growing since 2014. It is diffi cult to assess with great accuracy 
the number of Ukrainian citizens currently staying on the territory of 
Poland. According to the data of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Policy, the number of citizens of Ukraine who on December 31, 
2017 had valid declarations of intent to employ a foreigner, was 
517 thousand, and of people who have a work permit – 208 thousand. 
About 100 thousand should be added to account for those who stay in 
Poland permanently and do not need a work permit, as well as those who 
study or stay in Poland for other reasons. This gives an approximate 
number of 900,000 migrants from Ukraine staying in Poland at the end 
of 2017.16 On top of that, an unspecifi ed number of people working in 
our country illegally and perishing in the gray zone every day should 
be added. The estimate from the labor market are reported by 1–1.2 
million Ukrainians in Poland. 
15  Offi ce for Foreigners, Annual Report: legalisation of stay 2018, https://udsc.
gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/raport-roczny-legalizacja-pobytu/2018-2/ (access 
12.07.2019).
16  See M. Jaroszewicz, Migracje z Ukrainy do Polski. Stabilizacja trendu (Ukraine to 
Poland migration. Stabilisation of a trend), Raport OSW, no. 10/2018.
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Vietnamese immigration is an interesting phenomenon in Poland. 
Offi cial fi gures talk about a dozen or so thousand people, but there are 
probably about 30,000 of them. The fi rst wave of arrivals from Vietnam 
came to Poland in the 1960s and 1970s to study. Several hundred people 
remained permanently in Poland and later brought their compatriots.17
EU citizens registered in Poland come mainly from Germany, Italy, 
France, Great Britain, Bulgaria and Spain. Due to the freedom of movement 
of people in the EU, their number is diffi cult to determine. To illustrate 
the size of these internal migrations, the Offi ce for Foreigners’ data can be 
cited, according to which in 2017, 24 thousand German citizens registered 
permanent residence in our country.18
Refugees constitute a separate group of foreigners in Poland. According 
to the Offi ce for Foreigners, in the years 2005–2015 the average number of 
applications for international protection submitted annually amounted to 
around 9,200, and these were caused by the situation in the international 
environment.19 The following years brought on the refugee crisis and its 
aftermath, which will be discussed in a further part of the article.
An integral element of the country’s migration policy, apart from the 
policy addressed to immigrants, is the emigration policy addressed to Poles 
and people of Polish origin living outside the country. Their numbers 
abroad are assessed differently. It results from the use of varied criteria, 
such as birth in Poland, multi-ethnic origin, knowledge of the Polish 
language, or the declared sense of ties with the country. It is estimated that 
18–20 million Poles and people of Polish origin live outside of Poland. About 
30% of this group are Poles born and brought up in Poland, the rest are 
people of Polish descent with varying degrees of ties to their Polish heritage.20 
According to the Central Statistical Offi ce, in 2017 there were 6942 Polonia 
organizations in the world, through which, along with its diplomatic and 
consular missions, the government, and specifi cally the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which is responsible for the cooperation with the Polish diaspora, 
supports this group of Poles and people of Polish descent.
17  J. Operacz, Ilu ich jest, po co przyjechali? Cudzoziemcy w Polsce (How many 




19  Cudzoziemcy w Polsce. Podręcznik dla funkcjonariuszy publicznych (Foreigners in 
Poland. A Handbook for Public Offi cials), ed. E. Ostaszewska-Żuk, Helsinki Founda-
tion of Human Rights, Warsaw 2016, p. 19.
20  The government program of cooperation with the Polish diaspora and Poles 
abroad in the years 2015–2020. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015, pp. 3–4, https://www.
msz.gov.pl/resource/70a7021e-304c-4075-a812-18e5b3410966:JCR (access 12.07.2019).
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Changes in the Directions of Shaping the Polish Migration 
Policy in Response to the Refugee Crisis
The problem of migration has become an important element of the 
campaign before the parliamentary elections in Poland in 2015. Liberal 
parties, PO and PSL stressed the demographic situation in Poland and 
Europe and the labour market needs. The right party’s narratives were 
aimed at presenting migration only in the context of a terrorist threat and 
lowering the levels of security in the society, and Law and Justice chairman 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski even went so far as to express publicly that refugees 
would bring diseases to Poland: „There are symptoms of very dangerous 
diseases that have not been seen in Europe for a long time: cholera on 
the Greek islands, dysentery in Vienna, various types of parasites and 
protozoa, which are not dangerous to the bodies of these people, but can 
be dangerous here”.21 Such anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim narratives 
were presented to the society.
After coming to power, the government of Law and Justice only further 
expanded the direction of its migration policy sketched in the election 
campaign.
As part of ensuring greater security for Polish citizens and avoiding 
terrorist threats, the Act on granting protection to foreigners on the 
territory of the Republic of Poland was amended. Information on party, 
religious and trade union affi liations, as well as information about sexual 
life was added to information that could be processed in proceedings 
conducted regarding foreigners (name, surname, country of origin, 
education, fi ngerprints). The Act has so far been stuck at the project 
stage.22 In 2016, the law on counter-terrorism activities was adopted,23 in 
which many controversies arise from the provision of secret operations and 
reconnaissance regarding a foreigner who raises concerns of conducting 
terrorist activities: obtaining telephone conversations, checking the 
content of parcels they receive, or acquiring image and sound from public 
places.
The draft regulation of the Council of Ministers on the relocation of 
foreigners to Poland for the year of 2016 was prepared in January 2016 
21  A statement by J. Kaczyńskiego at the election rally in Makow Mazowiecki, „Gazeta 
Wyborcza” 13.10.2015, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,19014711,kaczynski-boi-sie-zara-
zy.html (access 7.07.2019)
22  Draft act amending the act on granting protection to foreigners with-
in the territory of the Republic of Poland, https://bip.kprm.gov.pl/kpr/wykaz/
r6014620366284,Projekt-ustawy-o-zmianie-ustawy-o-udzielaniu-cudzoziemcom-
ochrony-na-terytorium (access 11.07.2019).
23  Act of 10th June 2016 on anti-terrorist actions, Journal of Laws 2016, item 904.
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and concerned the implementation of Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 
of 14th September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of 
international protection for Italy and Greece. It provided for the relocation 
of 400 people from Greece and Italy and defi ned the amount of funds to 
cover the costs of transferring immigrants.24 The project was passed for 
public consultations, which were not completed, and because it concerned 
the year 2016 it became pointless.
The Ministry of Interior and Administration has become the body 
responsible for creating and implementing migration policy. The deputy 
minister responsible for migration issues, Jakub Skiba, stressed in his 
speeches that immigrants from the East should be the priority of Polish 
migration policy due to their cultural closeness, and that repatriation of 
Poles from the East should be of particular interest. This direction was 
followed by subsequent changes proposed in the Polish Charter.25 First, 
the group of people who can use it was expanded. As a result of another 
amendment of the 2016 Act, holders of the Polish Card who come to Poland 
with the intention to settle permanently will get a permanent residence 
card free of charge, after one year they will be eligible to apply for Polish 
citizenship, and in the meantime will be able to count on assistance 
during the adaptation period – among others they will be able to apply for 
a cash benefi t to cover the costs of management and current maintenance 
for a period of up to 9 months, co-fi nancing for renting an apartment, 
intensive Polish language learning or vocational courses.26 In May 2019, 
the Act on the Amendment to the Charter extending its operation to all 
countries of the world was adopted.27 The direction of changes undertaken 
in this area shows the attitude of the Law and Justice government towards 
looking for hands to work that are missing from the Polish labour market, 
among people who can show Polish roots and relationships with Poland. 
This would avoid opening the door to other „strangers”. According to 
the new concept, Polish migration policy should be aimed at accepting 
repatriates and not refugees.
The actions of the Law and Justice government in Poland quickly 
found a resonance in social reactions. According to the survey conducted 
24  Draft of January 12, 2016, Regulation of the Council of Ministers on the re-
location of foreigners in 2016, https://studylibpl.com/doc/916544/projekt-z-dnia-12-
stycznia-2016r.-r-o-z-p-o-r-z-ą-d-z-e-n.. (access 7.07.2019).
25  The Polish Charter is a document that confi rms Polish nationality, but not 
Polish citizenship. 
26  Act of 13th May 2016 on the Amendment to the Act on the Polish Charter, 
Journal of Laws 2016, item 753.
27  Act of 16th May 2019 on the Amendment to the Act on the Polish Charter, 
http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc8.nsf/ustawy/3362_u.htm (access 7.07.2019).
97
M. Pacek, Polish Migration Policy in the Context of the Migration Crisis
by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) published in December 
2017, as many as 63% of respondents do not want people who escaped from 
countries subject to armed confl ict to come to Poland. By contrast, 33% 
of respondents agree. And still, in mid-2015 the situation was reversed. 
In May of that year, only 21% of respondents were against accepting 
refugees. As many as 62% were in favour.28 When the survey questions 
concern the admission of people from the Middle East or Africa, as many 
as 75% are opposed to it. Only 32% would not like to accept refugees from 
eastern Ukraine. Poles are therefore reluctant to accept refugees from 
non-European cultures. The respondents pointed to cultural and religious 
differences, as well as the possible occurrence of social problems resulting 
from this, e.g. radical Islam.
Poland’s Migration Policy Created 
by the Law and Justice Government After 2015
Migration challenges and the needs of the labour market have led to 
the need to address the issue of long-term migration policy. Creating such 
a policy requires formulating a doctrine, defi ning goals and adapting 
instruments to their implementation. It also requires taking into account 
the geopolitical position and geographical location of Poland.
In December 2016, the Minister of Interior and Administration 
appointed an intra-ministerial team for the preparation of the new document 
„Migration policy of Poland”. During several team meetings, such extreme 
opinions were presented by its members that its operation was suspended 
in 2017. The reason was the discrepancy in the assessment of priorities: the 
labour market as opposed to security. Providing for all suggested elements 
of security in the document did not allow for the implementation and 
processing of proposals related to the needs of the labour market.
The year 2018 brought about the return to the discussion table. And 
some features have emerged that had been characteristic of this discussion 
ever since thinking of the Polish migration policy began. Among them is 
reactive thinking and action, building strategy as a response to what has 
already happened and requires a reaction. The experience of countries 
with long-lasting experience of migration allows us to carry out analyses, 
conduct targeted research and draw conclusions for our country, and based 
on that, to build a migration policy the implementation of which will 
28  M. Strzałkowski, Forteca Europa czyli Polacy a uchodźcy i migranci (Fortress Eu-
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prevent adverse events instead of solving them temporarily. It is important 
here to look at migration policy in the long-term, in perspective of 20–30 
years which would allow it to stabilize effectively, plan its permanent 
fi nancing and build a well-thought-out and desired social capital in the 
country. Assessing the best directions of foreigners’ infl ow could be the 
fi rst stage, then offering them competitive terms of residence and work, 
and fi nally investing in their integration in the host society. Because you 
cannot forget about what Max Frisch said many years ago: „(...) we asked 
for workers and we got people instead”.29 Newcomers not integrated 
into the host society are a problem that threatens this society as if it was 
a ticking bomb.
A large group of foreigners undertaking work on the territory of 
Poland remains outside the registration systems of entry and stay. This 
situation has led to the start of works on the act on the national register of 
foreigners and the establishment of a system that would combine all data, 
taking into account the entire history of the foreigner, from his entry to 
Poland, through his subsequent stays, employment and benefi ts received. 
This would allow them to be monitored and with well prepared analytical 
activities could be an excellent source of information about the directions, 
causes and intensifi cation of migration movements. The National Register 
of Foreigners would become an institution gathering information on 
all the affairs of foreigners in Poland. It would also be responsible for 
organizing adaptation courses for migrants, where they would learn about 
Polish culture, traditions and customs. From the provisions of the draft 
of the Polish migration policy submitted for discussion, it follows that 
the paradigm of immigration and integration based on the multicultural 
model requires a reorientation towards the concept of a leading culture 
and subordination of its culturally different elements.
A signifi cant role in the process of employing foreigners is played by 
temporary work agencies and employment agencies, of which almost 9,000 
operate in Poland.30 The model of exploitation of employees by these 
agencies present in Poland was adopted from other countries, where it 
had formed earlier (Holland, Germany, Italy). An agency organizes work 
for the migrants, together with accommodation and formalities related 
to the legality of stay. This means that foreign workers, mainly from 
Ukraine, are fully dependent on the agency. If they lose their jobs, they 
also lose their homes and have no safety net measures. The organization 
29  See J.F. Hollifi eld, The politics of international migration. How can we “bring the 
state back in”?, in: C.B. Brettel, J.F. Hollifi eld, Migration Theory, New York 2000.
30  Information included in the transcript of the Government Population Council 
seminar, Warsaw 14.01.2019.
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and working conditions themselves are under the control of the National 
Labour Inspectorate, but the procedure of employing an employee and 
concluding civil law contracts (not employment contracts, which are 
regulated by the Labour Code) remains outside the state’s control. The 
proposal to regulate this sphere has not been discussed during preparation 
of the new document. And the number of complaints in this area is 
growing, although it is often directed at the media, not the relevant state 
authorities.
The discourse on migration policy in a country like Poland, where 92% 
of the society declare membership in the Roman Catholic Church1,31 can 
not take place without taking into account the position of that Church. 
The analysis of this problem is faced with some diffi culties due to the fact 
that this position is inconsistent. One of those two “voices” is priest Janusz 
Balicki, a participant in the meetings of the Government Population 
Council and a member of the Council for Migration at the Polish Episcopate 
Conference, calling for solidarity in the issue of admitting refugees, if only 
because if there were a serious confl ict in Ukraine and many thousands of 
refugees came to Poland, Poland – which is not in a state of a refugee crisis 
today – is going to be left alone in the future. Father Balicki also indicates 
the religious and ethical aspect of the attitudes of many Polish Catholics 
towards refugees, but also economic migrants, and „aliens” in general.32 
There is the extremely valuable statement of the Social Council at the 
Metropolitan Poznań regarding refugees and migrants, dated January 11, 
2017,33 in which we read: „For Christians, the attitude of Christ described 
in the pages of the Gospel should serve as the example, even if it apparently 
does not correspond to the particular interests of individual people or 
nations. The Christian approach to refugees draws its inspiration from 
the Gospel call of Christ: ‘I was a stranger and you welcomed me’”. In its 
statement, the Council encourages Catholics and all people of good will 
who understand the tragedy of refugees and migrants, to courageously 
take up the challenge in the spirit of Christian openness and solidarity. 
Such an attitude is a response to the attitude towards refugees expressed 
31  Życie religijne w Polsce (Religious life in Poland) 18.12.2018. Wyniki Badania 
spójności społecznej (Results of the social cohesion research), p. 1, GUS 2018, https://stat.
gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/inne-opracowania/wyznania-religijne/zycie-religijne-w-
polsce-wyniki-badania-spojnosci-spolecznej-2018,8,1.html (access 12.07.2019).
32  Statement by J. Balicki included in the transcript from the seminar of the 
Government Population Council, Warsaw 14.01.2019.
33  „Byłem przybyszem a przyjęliście mnie”. Kościół apeluje w sprawie uchodźców 
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by Pope Francis, who during a meeting with Lutherans in the Vatican 
said: „naming yourself a Christian and refusing to accept a refugee or 
anyeone who seeks help, who is hungry or thirsty, is hypocrisy”, (...), 
„If I say that I am a Christian and I am chasing these people away, I am 
a hypocrite”.34 Unfortunately, there is a wave of hatred at the masses in 
many parishes, on the blogs of priests, towards refugees, those who defend 
them and want to take them under their roof. „We need mobilization to 
put a dam on the Muslim lagoon,” „The Pope is not infallible in this 
matter,” „Europe cannot see that it is giving itself up the worst kind of 
slavery: Islam”, „We will accept a stranger, give him shelter, tea, and he 
rapes our relatives, stabs us in the back”35 – these are just some of the 
opinions expressed on the web. The Polish society exceptionally easily 
absorbs the „word of God” from the mouths of its parish priests, often 
the more populist, nationalistic or instigating fear of strangers, the more 
suggestively it works on its imagination.
As it was mentioned before, the Polish government created by the 
Law and Justice criticized and displayed ill-disposed attitudes towards 
refugees and migrants. There are numerous statements made by the 
Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration Mariusz Błaszczak 
expressing this disapproval: „There would be almost 12,000 refugees (…), 
then after a few years there are tens of thousands, then several hundred 
thousand, then several million. These communities form closed enclaves 
that constitute a natural terrorist base”.36 Therefore, in our opinion, the 
actions taken by the European Union should be based on cooperation with 
third countries along migratory routes, building their capacity in terms 
of asylum, migration management and humanitarian aid for refugees 
near their countries of origin”.37 Similarly, anti-immigrant position was 
repeatedly held by Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki. Before the 
34  T. O’Malley, Statement by Pope Francis during a meeting with a group of Lutherans in 
Vatican, deon.pl, 13.10.2016, https://www.deon.pl/religia/serwis-papieski/aktualnosci-
papieskie/art,4927,kto-broni-chrzescijanstwa-a-przegania-uchodzcow-jest-hipokryta.
html (access 13.07.2019).
35  P. Żytnicki, T. Nyczka, Księża hejtują uchodźców w sieci (Priests are hating on 
refugees online), wyborcza.pl, 14.09.2015, http://wyborcza.pl/1,75398,18811057,ksieza-
hejtuja-uchodzcow-w-sieci.html (access 13.07.2019).
36  Imigracyjny kryzys w Europie. Błaszczak o migrantach (Imigration crisis in Eu-
rope. Błaszczak on immigrants), tvn24.pl, 13.06.2017, http://www.tvn24.pl (access 
13.07.2019).
37  Spór o relokację uchodźców. Polska chce umorzenia postępowania (A dispute over the 
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informal European Union summit in Salzburg (19–20 September 2018), 
to alleviate tensions on migration, he stressed that Poland’s position on 
refugees had not changed: „We have decided not to accept refugees, this is 
our sovereign decision”.38
The problem with assessing the policy of the Polish government led 
by Law and Justice is that when the conversation turns to the topic of 
migration which is problematic for the Polish authorities, Law and Justice 
politicians reverse the meaning of basic concepts and make a refugee out 
of every migrant arriving in Poland: “We have already accepted at least 
tens of thousands, if not even over a hundred thousands of refugees from 
Ukraine” – said Morawiecki in the New Year’s interview for TVP. Earlier, 
Beata Szydło as the Prime Minister stated in the European Parliament 
that Poland accepted about a million refugees from Ukraine. These verbal 
acrobatics are intended to justify not accepting real refugees from the 
Middle East and North Africa.
The case is similar when it comes to involvement (or lack thereof) in 
international initiatives undertaken in Europe and around the world.
On December 17, 2018 in Marrakesh, the UN General Assembly 
adopted by a large majority of votes a non-binding Pact on Refugees 
(Global Compact for Migration, GCM),39 providing for increased support 
for countries hosting the majority of over 25 million refugees in the world. 
Poland refused to support the document. It decided that the document, 
despite its non-binding nature, could be the basis for infl uencing 
individual countries, for example on the subject of resettlement. The head 
of the Polish Ministry of Interior Joachim Brudzinski emphasized in his 
recommendation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz 
that the Global Pact on Refugees „is a political declaration and contains 
political commitments to undertake specifi c actions”, which aim to 
„create a global division of responsibility for refugees and burdens related 
to their support and reception on their [host countries’] territory”.40 In 
the opinion of the Polish government, the adoption of the declaration 
38  Morawiecki o uchodźcach: decydujemy się nie przyjmować uchodźców (Morawiecki 




39  Global Compact for Migration, IOM, https://www.iom.int/global-compact-
migration (access 7.07.2019).
40  O. Zakolska, Polska nie wyraziła poparcia dla Globalnego Paktu w sprawie Uchodź-
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could result in pressure on Poland from the entities associated with the 
UN and non-governmental organizations whose aim will be to make the 
government implement commitments that are broader than expected, such 
as resettlement. In addition, the justifi cation reads that the Pact did not 
put enough emphasis on a permanent solution to the situation of refugees 
by supporting them in regions of origin, as well as the implementation of 
voluntary returns to their countries. Such argumentation is a permanent 
element of the migration policy of the right-wing government of Law and 
Justice. Some mitigation of criticism for the lack of support for the Global 
Migration Agreement may be infl uenced by the fact that Poland was 
among the 200 member countries of the UN that unanimously adopted 
the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants,41 which is the basis 
for the Marrakesh Agreement. 
Works on the „Migration policy of Poland” document are underway 
and in the face of numerous critical remarks from expert groups dealing 
with migrations, politicians, economists and NGOs, we will have to wait 
for their completion. But their direction is already quite clear today: the 
security of Polish citizens is a superior goal, and solidarity in the refugee 
problem should be fl exible in its character.
Conclusions
The migration policy of a country, which requires the formulation 
of doctrine, outlining of goals and creation of tools to achieve these 
goals should be created taking into account the long-term perspective. 
Only then can the actions taken bring the intended effect. Thinking 
in a long-term perspective, however, requires politicians to recognize 
continuity and consistency in pursuing goals as a prerequisite. 
Democracy itself, however, means that the majority vote may be 
tilted in one election towards one political option, and in the next 
one towards another. And thus, the priorities in various areas of life 
undergo sinusoidal changes.
This is the exact situation we have to face in the process of creating the 
Polish migration policy. As the author has already mentioned, Poland, 
which is characterized by relatively large national homogeneity, has no 
migration experience. The political change in 1989 and the accession to 
the EU changed its situation in this area – there were great migrations 
of Polish citizens to the countries which opened their labour markets to 
41  Deklaracja polityczna Marrakeszu (Marrakesh Political Declaration), Rabat 
Process, Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, https://trybun.org.
pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/deklaracja.marakeszPL.pdf (access 17.07.2019).
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them, and at the same time migrants and refugees arrived from abroad, 
mainly from behind the eastern border. This situation forced the country 
to search for solutions to emerging problems in an ad hoc mode, not long-
term and based on reliable analysis.
The liberal government of PO/PSL formulated the priorities of the 
migration policy on the assessment of the demographic situation and the 
needs of the labour market emptied out as a result of depopulation and 
migration. A change of government in the autumn of 2015 to the right-
wing government of Law and Justice, with the migration/refugee crisis 
in the background, re-evaluated these priorities towards ensuring security 
for Polish citizens. The element of openness to strangers disappeared 
from the program documents and the public debate. The Law and Justice 
party has radicalised its anti-immigrant position not so much as a result of 
strengthening its views in this area, but as a result of becoming the ruling 
party and the populist need to gain support for certain social groups and 
strengthen its election results. The public media implementing this policy 
in this area consistently changed the attitudes of Poles towards foreigners, 
especially those of other cultures. The threat of Islam has become the main 
scare of the ruling party in relation to the society that has had no experiences, 
especially bad ones, in coexisting on one territory with Muslims because 
there have only been trace numbers of them in Poland. The thesis about 
a change in the approach to the problem of foreigners in our country is 
confi rmed by the representative of Law and Justice, Mariusz Kaminski in 
the Seym in June 2002 during the debate on the war in Chechnya, when 
he said, „(...) Today, when we live in an independent country, we are facing 
a diffi cult exam of our decency. Can we show elementary human solidarity 
and compassion to the victims of regimes, dictatorships and dirty wars. 
(...) Poles, the nation of refugees, have special moral obligations to those 
who today escape their countries from war, prison and torture. We have no 
right to demonstrate indifference and cynicism, because we have received 
too much in the past to excuse ourselves today with modest budgetary 
possibilities”.42 However, Deputy Minister Konrad Szymański, present in 
the Government of Law and Justice, will say in June 2017 that „Member 
States should be free to choose instruments for showing European 
42  4th term, 24th sitting, 3rd day (21.06.2002), point 33 of the daily agenda, MP 
Mariusz Kamiński, http://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/5c30b337b5bc240ec125746d003
0d0fc/449ddb946974a3bdc1257473002b9bbb?OpenDocument, see A. Adamczyk, Kryzys 
migracyjny w Europie a polska polityka migracyjna (Migration crisis in Europe and the Polish 
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solidarity.” I would like to emphasize that Poland invariably opposes 
„any projects of transnational management of the migration movement” 
(...) although „in the face of the migration crisis it offers its participation 
in almost all European activities”, offering assistance to refugees in their 
countries or neighbouring countries, away from Europe.43
The migration policy currently being created by the right-wing 
government of Law and Justice is aimed at fi lling gaps on the Polish labour 
market primarily by encouraging Poles to return from emigration (which 
requires an attracting economic factor), activating actions to increase 
repatriation of Poles from the East (here, an element of securing fi nances 
for such an operation by the government also play an important role) and 
assimilation of foreigners planning to stay in Poland (by changing the 
thinking in terms of multiculturalism to the idea of a leading culture that 
eliminates otherness and diversity).
Given the current political option, European solidarity in the area of 
refugees assumes the form of strengthening border protection, sending 
guard troops to areas threatened by escalation of exile and contesting 
decisions taken at the EU level to share responsibility.
The direction of the migration policy pursued by the government 
raises concerns of many experts, politicians and part of the Polish society. 
Particularly in the context of climate change and demographic changes in 
the world, especially in Africa, which threatens to double its population by 
2050, and the existence of confl ict centres, also behind the eastern border 
of our country. A single European country will not defend itself against 
future migratory and refugee threats. Lack of solidarity in this respect 
may turn out to be serious for such a country. This problem needs to be 
taken into account in the migration policy of Poland, with an emphasis 
on creating it in the long-term perspective and in agreement with other 
countries. Both priorities – social security and labour market needs – 
should be treated equally, and integration processes of foreigners should 
not disappear from the government’s optics, regardless of its political 
option. Demographic and climate challenges are common challenges for 
all European countries, so they should be a binder rather than contribute 
to disintegration. Historically, populism has led to destruction and it 
seems that Europe has already learned the lesson.
43  A. Zachová, E. Zgut, K. Zbytniewska, M. Strzałkowski, Z. Gabrizova, Grupa 
Wyszehradzka zjednoczona przeciwko uchodźcom (The Visegrad Group united against 
refugees), Euractiv, 24.07.2017, https://www.euractiv.pl/section/grupa-wyszehradzka/
news/grupa-wyszehradzka-zjednoczona-przeciw-uchodzcom/ (access 10.09.2018).
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